证券期货规章草案公开征求意见试行规则

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证券期货规章草案公开征求意见试行规则

中国证券监督委员会


证监会公告[2009]7号



现公布《证券期货规章草案公开征求意见试行规则》,自2009年5月8日起施行。





二○○九年四月二十日





证券期货规章草案公开征求意见试行规则


第一条 为了贯彻科学立法、民主立法的原则,增强公众参与证券期货规章制定的程度,提高制度建设的质量,根据《立法法》、《规章制定程序条例》、《证券期货规章制定程序规定》的规定,制定本规则。

第二条 中国证券监督管理委员会(以下简称中国证监会)制定证券期货规章,应当向社会公开征求意见。涉及国家秘密、国家安全或者证券期货市场敏感问题的,采取其他方式征求意见。

第三条 向社会公开征求意见,应当履行批准程序后实施。

第四条 向社会公开征求意见,应当将征求意见稿及其起草说明在中国证监会网站、中国证监会指定的上市公司公开披露信息的报刊等媒体上刊登,并按照要求报送国务院法制办有关部门。

起草说明应当阐明制定的背景、需要解决的主要问题、拟采取的主要措施和设定的制度等。

必要时,可以就征求意见涉及的事项,设计清晰、简洁的问题或者问卷供公众回答。

征求意见稿修改或整合有关现行规定的,应当一并制作并公布修正前后条文对照表或者条文来源对照表,供公众参阅。

第五条 向社会公开征求意见,应当提供意见反馈途径,公布传真号码、电子邮箱和通讯地址,或者指定专门的意见征求管理系统,提供其详细的网址。

公开征求意见的公告,应当载明征求意见活动的截止时间。征求意见期间原则上为15日,但因情况特殊,需尽快发布、施行的除外。

第六条 征求意见办理部门应当及时收集、整理、归纳、分析、研究公众反馈意见,形成向社会公开征求意见报告。对拟采纳的意见,报告应当提出具体的修改建议;对于拟不采纳的意见,报告应当说明理由。

在提请主席办公会议审议或者签发规章草案时,应当一并报送向社会公开征求意见报告。

第七条 中国证监会公布规章全文及其征求意见稿、起草说明、发布新闻稿或答记者问等,方便社会公众查阅。

第八条 中国证监会制定涉外规范性文件,以及直接涉及公民、法人和其他组织切身利益或者涉及向社会提供公共服务、直接关系到社会公共利益的其他规范性文件,适用本规则。但是,涉及国家秘密、国家安全或者证券期货市场敏感问题的除外。

前款所称涉外规范性文件,是指涉及下列内容的规范性文件:

(一)对外开放的方针性、政策性、原则性的制度设定或调整;

(二)规范境外个人和企业、组织或其活动的制度设定或调整。

第九条 本规则自2009年5月8日起施行。


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我国国企MBO制度缺陷与对策研究

江泽利



摘 要

MBO是英文Management Buy-out的缩写,中文通常被译作“管理层”收购,是指公司的管理层利用借贷所融资本或股权交易收购本公司股权,以改变公司的所有者结构、资产结构和控制权结构,使企业原经营者成为企业所有者的一种行为。
我国自引进MBO制度以来,对国有企业,尤其是对我国中小型国有企业,通过管理层收购实施了国有股产权改革,取得了较好的成效。但同时也暴露了许多产权改革过程中的不良现象,如,违规融资、不公开定价、“自卖自买”等交易,造成国有资产严重流失,引起了社会公众的普遍关注,也招致社会各界的议论和不满。
这些不满和议论随着“郎顾之争”的升温而被推向了高潮,成为继1994年“国企改革大讨论”之后的又一次“产权改革大讨论”,且迅速席卷全国。
讨论的中心议题是MBO是否还应该在中国继续被实施。 MBO过程中是否真的存在“国有资产流失”现象,政府是否应该停止国有企业MBO,诸如此类的问题也引起了政府的关注与重视。对此,国资委主任李荣融在2004年10月底的一次新闻发布会上发言时承认,“当前国有资产流失问题集中在MBO,而MBO收购过程中的主要问题就是自卖自买”。2004年12月12日,时任国务院副总理的黄菊同志,又在出席2004年度中央企业负责人年终总结大会时指出:“大型企业不准搞管理层收购,中小企业的管理层收购也要区别情况,要规范。对于管理层收购,国资委要制定发布专门文件,做到有章可循。”
政府代表的发言表明,一,对我国国有企业MBO的功过是非予以了客观评价。为回应民众要求制止民脂民膏不被侵吞的强烈呼声,对发生在国有企业MBO过程的非正常现象予以承认。二,国有企业中还将继续实施MBO。我国国有资产改革的大方向不会变,MBO作为国有企业实现国有股减持的有效措施仍将被继续。三,我国国有企业MBO过程中存在着的这样或那样的一些不尽人意问题,是可以通过制度完善,规范操作来加以避免的。
政府对规范MBO行为有信心,我也一样希望对MBO制度缺陷与对策进行研究分析的,探索一套可行的制度,以保证MBO健康进行。本文通过引用西方经济学理论,如激励机制、产权理论、新制度经济学、产业经济学、产业结构理论、博弈论、制度供给理论及信息经济学等,对我国国有企业MBO制度及制度实施现状进行了全面分析研究,并适度采用了对比法,对中外MBO制度理论进行对比分析。全文共分为三个部分:
第一部分为第1章,是论文基础部分。在这一部分,作者通过对MBO的起源及基本概念的界定,提出了自己的初步观点,即,MBO是“管理者收购”,而非“管理层收购”,充实了长期以来指导我国MBO实践的理论。
第二部分包括第2、3两章,是论文实证分析部分,也是理论联系实际的重要部分。在这一部分,作者从我国国有企业MBO的历史出发,客观评述了MBO对我国国有企业产权改革的重要作用,也揭示了MBO实践中存在的一些问题;接着,作者又从我国现行有关MBO制度入手,阐明了我国现行MBO制度的现状及存在的缺陷和不足,为对策研究提供了充分的事实依据。
第三部分为第4章,是对策和建议部分。这一部分在前面两部分基础之上,从理论创新、制度完善、监督控制等几个方面,对避免和防止MBO实施过程中“国有资产流失”现象,提出了一整套建设性建议和应对措施。对我国国有企业MBO目标及实施措施提出了新的要求,也是对前两部分研究的综合与提升,是本文研究的落脚点,充分体现了本文研究的理论和实践意义。

关键词: 国有企业 MBO 制度缺陷 对策


Abstract

MBO is an abbreviation of Management Buy-out in English. In Chinese, the abbreviation is usually translated to purchase of "the management "that is refers to the management as one level of the company, for change the owner structure, the property structure and the domination structure of the company, use to lend money to purchases the stock of this company, causes the enterprise original operator to become the enterprise owner's one kind of behavior.
Since our country has been introduced, the MBO system, as an implement of the property reform, to the state-owned enterprise, especially to our middle and small scale state-owned enterprise, which has achieved a good result.
But simultaneously, it also has exposed some undesirable phenomena in process of the property reforms, such as illegal financing, pricing is not open, "traders from buying", and other transactions, resulting in serious loss of state assets, has not only aroused the universal concern of the public but also lead to the community to debate and discontent.
Whit “the dispute of Lang with Gu” was heat up, these dissatisfaction and the discussion is pushed to the high tide, became "the property right to reform the big discussion" which is continues "the state-owned enterprise to reform the big discussion" in 1994, and rapidly sweep all over our country.
In this discussion, it is central that MBO whether also should continue in China. In the MBO process whether the real existence the phenomenon about "the state asset does drain", whether the government should stop state-owned enterprise MBO, the so forth question was repeatedly asked by the public that has aroused government department's interest and takes.
At end of October of 2004, arm at the Public matter of concern proposed which on the discussion process in, Li RongRong as director of State Asset Management Committee, make the speech at a press conference, said, "the question, the current state asset drains, to concentrate in MBO, but the main question, in the MBO process, is from sells buys".
On December 12th, 2004, Huang Ju ,as Vice-Premier of our State, in attends annual's end congress of 2004 year, pointed out, "The major industry does not permit to do MBO, in mid- and small-scale enterprise, the MBO also must distinguish the situation, wants the standard. Regarding the MBO, the State Asset Management Committee must formulate the issue special document, achieves has a legal basis."
In my opinion, the government representative's speech has indicated three meanings. Firstly, it is an evaluation to the operation of our state-owned enterprise by MBO. In order to respond the populace request to stop the action of embezzles which likes flesh and blood of the people, the government acknowledged that it is an unusual phenomenon that above mention phenomena in the MBO of state-owned enterprise process. Secondly, it is an attitude of our government on the question whether continues in the state-owned enterprise to implement MBO. The general orientation of our state asset reform have never been change, MBO, as one effective action to took the state-owned share reduction, will to be continue. Thirdly, these phenomena in our country state-owned enterprise MBO process is may be perfect through set up the standard operates performs and repaid the system to avoid.
Government acts to regulate MBO confidence, as I also hope that the MBO system defects and countermeasures research and analysis, to explore a workable system to ensure that the MBO health. By reference western economic theory, such as the incentive mechanism, and property rights theory, New institution Economics(NIE), industrial economics, and the industrial structure theory, game theory and information theory, and so on, I conducted a comprehensive analysis for China's state-owned enterprises MBO system and the status of implementation of the system, and appropriate use of the comparative method with the foreign MBO system theory. This thesis is divided into three parts:
Part I is chapter 1 is the basis of the thesis. In this section, the author through the MBO and the origin of the definition of basis concepts, raised individual preliminary view that, MBO is one kind of behavior about purchase by manager who is personal rather than by manager who are one collectivity, and enrich the guidance of China's MBO has a theory of practice.
Part II includes chapters 2 and 3, this section is an important part in the paper with empirical Analysis of linking theory with reality. In this section, the author objective review of the MBO as property rights reform of China abut state-owned enterprises from the history of MBO in china, and revealed the existence of the practice of some problems. Author has start study from China's current system of MBO, elaborated China's current MBO system and the status of the existing defects and shortcomings. This part is measures to provide sufficient factual basis for countermeasures study.
Part III be refers to Chapter 4 which is recommendations and responses for above write. Basis of the front part of this thesis, the author put forward a set of constructive proposals and responding to the program, for avoid and prevent the "loss of state assets" phenomenon, a set of constructive proposals and response measures, from the theoretical innovation, and the system improve, supervision and control etc several aspects.
These suggests put forward new requirements for target of reform in China's state-owned enterprises and standard of implementation. This is the end-result of this study and is consolidated and upgrading for parts I and II on this thesis which fully embodies the theoretical and practical significance.

Keyword: State-Owned Enterprises of China/ MBO/ System Shortcoming /Countermeasure

目  录

论文摘要

第1章 绪 论 1
1.1 选题背景 1
1.1.1 问题的提出 1
1.1.2 研究的现实意义 2
1.2 MBO起源与概念界定 3
1.2.1 MBO的起源 3
1.2.2 MBO的概念 5

国家烟草专卖局关于规范烟用香精香料产品标识标注的通知

国家烟草专卖局


国家烟草专卖局关于规范烟用香精香料产品标识标注的通知

行业各直属单位,中国烟草实业发展中心:
  为维护国家利益和消费者权益,确保卷烟产品质量的稳定,依据《产品质量法》、《烟草专卖法》及烟草行业有关管理办法,现就规范烟用香精香料产品标识标注的工作要求如下:
  一、各省级工业公司应要求卷烟生产企业严格按照YC/T164-2003《烟用香精和料液》产品质量标准采购烟用香精香料,从2006年7月1日起采购入库的烟用香精香料产品必须在标签及包装体上的显著位置有明确标注,即生产企业名称和详细地址、产品名称或代号、商标(如有注册)、净重、生产批号、生产日期、保质期、贮存条件、产品标准编号、溶剂名称(如含有溶剂)、相对密度值、折光指数值。
  二、卷烟生产企业应与烟用香精香料供应单位签订双方认可的技术合同,内容应包括产品主要成分名称;YC/T164-2003标准中规定的但未在产品包装及标签标注的技术指标;标识所标注的产品标准文本等。
  三、按照国家局、总公司2002年第1号《通告》要求,国家局将严格按照《烟用香精和料液》产品质量标准进行监督检查,对不符合要求的烟用香精香料产品及企业进行通报;未按本通知规定执行标识标注的产品行业卷烟生产企业不得采购使用。


二OO六年一月十二日